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UNCONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS OF MILITARY AUTHORITY.'
F ,NY WNTHRoP BAirnAxITE. 2
The United States remains externally at peace in the midst of a
world war, yet within all is not peace. Industrial strife attended
with violence and bloodshed has recently given rise to several occa-
sions for the prolonged intervention of the military, notably in Colo-
rado, Montana and West Virginia. The. strike of the. miners in Colo-
rado, lasting over twelve months, has attracted the attention of the
whole country by its bitterness and distressing tragedies. Idaho and
Pennsylvania have seen similar troubles, and to a less degree, Ohio,
Michigan, New Jersey and Massachusetts. Peace must, of course, be
maintained at all hazards, but certain new and extraordinary claims
of arbitrary military authority have been made and acted upon in
several of these industrial conflicts, to which careful study and atten-
tion ought to be directed.
It is a widespread superstition among military men, and among
many other well informed persons, that there is some mysterious and
transcendant force in a declaration of martial law. The idea seems
to be growing'that it is the prerogative and function of the military
to substitute itself for all civil authority, and that while it is in control
the constitutions, courts and laws may be suspended and set aside.8
At the time of the great fire which followed the earthquake of
April 18, 1906, at San Francisco, the federal troops were called out
by General Funston. A proclamation was issued early on the first
day of the fire, which announced that:
"The federal troops, the members of the police force, and all
special police officers have been authorized to kill any and all persons
found engaged in looting, or in the c6mmission of any other crime."
Here we have the assumption of the power of life and death over
the citizen.
Further illustrations of the assertion of arbitrary power by fed-
eral as well as state military authorities are not far to seek. Recently,
in the Colorado strike General Chase, of the Colorado National
Guard, claimed the right to arrest without warrant any one at any
'This article is based upon a paper read at the first annual meeting of the
American Society of Military Law, a branch of the American Institute of Crim-
inal Law and Criminology, Washington, D. C., October 19, 1914.2Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin; Secretary American Society of
Military Law.
sSee the present writer, "Military Dictatorship in California and West Vir-
ginia," I California Law Review, 413; also E. M. Cullen, "Decline of Personal
Liberty in America," 48 Ain. Law Rev. 345.
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place in the state during military occupation. Many men were so
airested and held in jail upwards of fifty days against whom no specific
accusation of crime was or could be brought, on the vague plea of
"military necessity." Private houses were searched for arms without
any search warrant. Such highhanded measures naturally aroused the
deepest resentment. (See John T. Fitch, Law & Order in Colorado,
23 The Survey 241 (Dec. 5, 1914). The newspapers report that an
embargo was put on commerce in arms and the transportation of armi
and ammunition by any of the railroads or express companies in the
state of Colorado for any purposes except for the federal troops. By
order of the commander of the federal forces it is said that all saloons
in certain districts were closed and that fire arms were outlawed and
ordered to be surrendered under penalty of confiscation. It is further
reported that the state and later the federal officers in charge in
Colorado refused to permit the opening of mines with the aid of strike
breakers or non-union men, brought into the district by the cial com-
panies.
One of the most extreme instances of the substitution of military
force for law arose in West Virginia during the years 1912 and 1913.
Industrial trouble of the gravest character had arisen between the
coal miners and coal operators of Paint Creek and Cabin Creek, in
Kanawha county, West Virginia. A strike was declared, and non-
union labor was brought in to replace the strikers. The coal operators
employed "guards" to protect their laborers and their property. The
strikers were armed, and machine guns were installed by the operators.
September 2, 1912, Governor Glasscock purported to proclaim martial
law within a prescribed zone, and appointed a military commission
of six officers of the national guard to try all offenders, except mem-
bers of the national guard, and a court martial to try the latter. The
first military commission so established is said to have tried and sen-
tenced over one hundred citizens not engaged in the military service
of the state, and military commissions later established tried and sen-
tenced scores of other citizens not so engaged. The general orders for
the guidance of the West Virginia military commission, in express
terms, established it as a substitute for the civil courts. The Governor
and military acted under the claim that all the provisions of the con-
stitutions, both state and national, and all the laws and statutes of the
state were suspended and for the time inoperative by reason of the
existence of martial law. The proceedings which occurred stirred the
lawyers of the Senate to an official inquiry. In the investigation con-
ducted by a Senate Committee of Inquiry, Capt. Morgan, one of the
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members of the military commission, testified (in answer to a question
put by Senator Borah) as follows:
Q. Now, then Capt. Morgan, if the military tribunal of
which you were a member had seen fit to sentence a man to
the penitentiary for life for perjury, you would have felt that
you had the power to do it, would you not?
A. Yes, sir; as I viewed it at that time I considered it
to be the law.
Colonel George S. Wallace, Judge Advocate General,
testified:
"My theory of the whole situation was that the governor
had a right to declare military law. If he declared military
law, then the laws of war applied, and the laws of war would
fix the punishment within the discretion of the military power."
Q. Then you assumed that the constitution and civil law
were suspended?
A. I did; and the Supreme Court has sustained that as-
sumption.
Q. You took the position all the way through this case
you have referred to that there was no law within the military
zone other than the will of the commander in chief?
A. Absolutely; and maintain that yet!
As Colonel Wallace said, the supreme court of appeals of West
Virginia has sustained to a great extent the power of the governor to
supersede the laws and constitution of the state by military orders
aiid to establish his will as the supreme authority.4 In these cases the
West Virginia court, Ira E. Robinson, Justice, alone dissenting, re-
fused to release, on habeas corpus, prisoners held in custody under
commitment and sentence or awaiting trial by the military commis-
sion. As Justice Robinson put the question presented in the "Mother"
Jones case: "May citizens accused of civil offenses be tried, sen-
tenced and imprisoned or executed by military commissions at the
will of the governor of the state, notwithstanding the civil courts hav-
ing jurisdiction of the offense are open?"
In the recent case of Hatfield v. Graham5, the West Virginia
court reiterated its doctrines. The court granted a writ of prohibition
against the exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court in entertaining
a suit for malicious trespass against the governor and certain officers
of the militia who acted under the governor's orders and suppressed
an issue of a newspaper known as the "Socialist Labor Star." The
plant of this paper was at a point in the state remote from the martial
law zone. It was charged that an issue of the paper was about to be
4State ex rel. Mays v. Browmt 71 W. Va. 527; 77 S. E. 243. EX parte Joites,
71 W. Va. 609; 77 S. E. 1029.
5W. Va. 81 S. E. 533, March, 1914. Compare Ulster Sq. Dealer v, Fowler,
58 Misc. (N. Y.) 325; 111 N. Y. Supp. 16.
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circulated, antagonizing the governor and encouraging further dis-
order, and that some copies would be mailed into the district. It was
held to be within the governor's power as commander-in-chief to sup-
press the entire issue, to prevent its getting into the mails.
"How about freedom of speech and of the press?" you may well
ask. The court concedes that under ordinary conditions of peace the
governor could not have lawfully exercised such apparently arbitrary
power; but, it is said, a condition existed which amounted to domestic
war, and called for the exercise of military power of the state to sup-
press it. The necessity for the act is its justification. As the governor
had the discretion to determine whether the necessity therefor existed,
the courts have no power to review his discretion or to pronounce his
warrant or command unlawful as being in excess of his constitutional
power; and if the governor is exempt this immunity protects his sub-
ordinates also. The governor has only to answer that he acts officially,
and an action, though alleging that his act is malicious and wholly
"without his political province," will be prohibited both as to him
and to his subordinate military officers, whether they act under his
written or oral command.
A reign of martial law somewhat similar in its claims to that in
West Virginia was inaugurated in Montana the first of September,
1914, by proclamation- of Gov. Stewart, as a result of industrial war-
fare and dynamiting by strikers in Butte. Here are parts of a sup-
plementary proclamation by the commanding officer of the Montana
National Guard that Silver Bow county be governed, until further
orders, by military authority:
(5) All saloons and places where intoxicating liquors
are sold at retail as a beverage will be closed at once and
kept closed until further order. The stock of liquors of any
person or persons violating this rule will be destroyed and
all violations severely punished.
(6) Misdemeanors will be punished by the summary
court. Maj. Jesse B. Roote is hereby appointed and consti-
tuted summary court of the military forces in said Silver Bow
county. Violations of state and federal laws, other than mis-
demeanors, will be referred to a proper military commission
for trial and punishment; civil causes will await the ordinary
tribunals.
(7) No publication, either in newspaper, pamphlet,
handbill or otherwise, in any way reflecting upon the United
States, the state of Montana or their officers, civil or military,
or tending to influence the public mind against them, will be
tolerated.
(9) All assemblages in streets and highways are for-
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bidden. Assemblages in other places can only be held after
the permission of the commanding officer is given.
(10) Children under 18 years of age will not be permitted
on the streets after 7 o'clock p. in., nor before 6 o'clock a. m.
Women are requested to not appear on the streets after 8
o'clock p. in., nor before 6 o'clock a. m.
(12) It is hoped that martial law in Silver Bow county
will be mild and gentle; but it will be quickly and vigorously
exercised when occasion requires.
Given this 1st day of September, 1914.
DAN J. DONOHUE, Major Commanding.
Official: JESSE B. ROOTE, Major and Adjutant.
Under this proclamation the militia suspended and took over the
government of Butte and Silver Bow county and ordered the police
court to desist from trying offenders. On September 4th the officer
in command of the military force of the state issued orders to the
mayor and city council of the city of Butte as follows:
"I hereby permit the full and free operation of all of the
several departments of the city of Butte, except that the
police court of said city will remain suspended until further
orders from me."
On September 3d, Major Jesse B. Roote opened a summary mili-
tary court, without other commission than military orders, and dis-
posed of the regular police court business.' He announced from the
bench his theory of the status of his court, somewhat as follows: "The
rulings of this court," he said, "are without appeal or review by any
power on earth. All powers of the prosecuting attorney and civil
officers are suspended during military rule. The military authority
may permit such civil officers as it sees fit to continue their duties.
The civil courts have, by order of the commander of the militia, been
permitted to perform their functions. The military tribunals may
prescribe their own rules of procedure, and while the accused are not
entitled to counsel they may have counsel here if they see fit. Mili-
tary courts may prescribe their own punishments. This court will not
be severe. It will not convict anyone except on satisfactory evidence.
There will be no bitterness on its part, but the old maxim that 'tyranny
is better than anarchy' applies. There is nothing in the law limiting
the punishment that may be inflicted by the court."
Major Roote proceeded to exercise daily his functions of major,
judge, jury, sheriff, lawgiver and prosecuting attorney. The case of a
barber named Waidner furnishes an example of the wonderful effi-
GThe attitude of the Montana Supreme Court and the puncturing of this in-
flated reign of martial law by its decision vill be referred to later. See Ex parte
McDonald, I re Gillis, 143 Pac. 947.
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ciency of military justice. On September 9th, Waidner was given
sixty days in a military prison for insulting the uniform of the na-
tional guard, insulting the flag and the governor of the state and re-
sisting the lawful authorities, how? by refusing to shave a soldier
because he was a militiaman!
Application was made to the federal district court for writs of
habeas corpus to release three or four men held as military prisoners.
Judge Bourquin refused the application for the writs on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction. In an opinion delivered from the bench, how-
ever, he is reported to have upheld in sweeping terms the claims that*
the power of the military is virtually absolute.7 His theory it seems
is substantially this: If the executive officers of a court are resisted
in the exercise of its processes and decrees, the court is a closed court,
even though its doors be open. Thereby the constitution and the stat-
utes are overthrown; for there is no law where the courts are closed
by reason of inability to execute process. While the governor is en-
gaged in maintaining order there are no courts and no civil officers,
until restored by the governor. He may restore them one by one, with
more or less power, as he proceeds in suppressing the insurrection.
His judgment is supreme therein. All statutes and constitutional guar-
antees are suspended by insurrection. There is no restraint upon the
governor but his conscience, his honor and his humanity, except that
he may possibly be impeached or held to account later if unreasonably
and willfully severe and oppressive. The recitals of fact in his procla-
mations are conclusive. While the President or Governor cannot sus-
pend the writ of habeas corpus, they can suspend the courts. Dis-
turbers inciting to riot may be held in military custody even if the
writ of habeas corpus is not suspended.
Under this military form of government Lieutenant Baker was
appointed, on September 4th, military censor. His jurisdiction em-
braced the publication and distribution of any and, all newspapers and
handbills in Silver Bow county. Major Donohue gave a permit for
services to be held in Catholic churches in honor of the election of
Pope Benedict XV. It was also permitted to ring bells in the churches.
The saloons were closed and stocks of liquor were confiscated by the
soldiers for selling liquor contrary to military orders. Three men
were sentenced to terms of years in the state'penitentiary at Deer
Lodge and conducted there by a squad of militia under sentence by
the military commission for the offence of carrying guns after the
institution of martial law.
7I have had to rely on the files of the Anaconda Standard, a leading paper
of Montana friendly to the mining interests, for the account of the occurrences
in Butte.
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A prominent attorney who had dared to protest to Senator Walsh
by telegraph against the military dictatorship and who had taken
the lead in applying for writs of habeas corpus to the federal and
state courts on behalf of some military prisoners, was sent for and
brought before the military commander by the provost marshal. The
gallant commander, having the attorney under his physical power,
proceeded to insult and bullyrag him and to denounce his words and
actions as contemptible. He was informed that the only reason he
was not slapped in jail was because it might glorify him in the eyes of
the people as a political martyr.
During the Ohio floods, a company of the Ohio National Guard
established a picket line surrounding a portion of the flooded district
of the city of Warren, Ohio, a district which had been abandoned by
the citizens, leaving much property unprotected therein. The picket
line was established for the purpose of preventing persons going into
that district without a pass. One Smith attempted to pass through
the picket line to take some pictures, in defiance of the orders of the
soldiery. He was arrested by the military. On petition for a habeas
corpus the court of common pleas declared that the commanding officer
of the militia may make reasonable regulations for the protection of
life and property, and the troops may arrest or eject persons attempt-
ing to cross guarded lines.
It is reported by Col. H. J. Turney of Cleveland, Ohio, who was
on duty as Judge Advocate at Dayton, that the militia established a
military commission, and tried thieves, looters and other criminals, at
the time of the Dayton floods. About 117 cases were disposed of, and
some of those tried were sentenced to work on the streets under mili-
tary guard.
Coming now to a discussion of the law applicable to these situa-
tions, it may help to focus attention on the fundamental issues in-
volved, to formulate some of the principal questions of law that have
arisen by reason of the broad claims of military authority recently
asserted and acted on in these cases.
I. What is the effect of a proclamation of martial law, and
does it suspend the constitution, and the laws of the state and of the
United States?
I. Does the governor of a state, by such proclamation, confer
on himself, or on his military representatives, a supreme and unlimited
power over all his fellow-citizens, within the space described, which
suspends the functions of civil courts and magistrates and substitutes
8h; re Snzith, Cuyahoga Com. Pleas, June, 1913; 23 Ohio Dec. 667.
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in their place the mere will of the military commander?
III. May the military disregard the writ of habeas corpus, or
other process of the courts, if issued? Is the writ of habeas corpus
in practical effect suspended by such proclamation ?
IV. May a military commission, or summary courts, be estab-
lished as a substitute for the ordinary civil courts, to try civilians for
(a) felony, (b) misdemeanors, or (c) disobedience of orders and
proclamations ?
V. If so, is there any limit to the punishments which may be
prescribed and inflicted? May the military confiscate property and
levy fines, as well as imprison and put to death at their discretion?
VI. If they take life, or injure person or property, are the mili-
tary authorities immune from civil suit or criminal prosecution for
unreasonable acts done in excess of authority? Are the ordinary
courts without jurisdiction to inquire into and review the legality of
military measures?
VII. May the military shoot persons caught looting, or in the
commission of other crimes?
VIII. May the military arrest without warrant, merely on sus-
picion of complicity in the rioting, or other disturbances? May they
forcibly enter and search private houses and seize property without a
search warrant?
IX. May the military hold and detain prisoners so arrested on
suspicion, for indefinite periods at their discretion, without charge
of crime and without turning them over to the civil courts for trial?
X. May the military issue executive orders and proclamations
to the citizens generally, having the force of law?
(a) May the military close saloons and confiscate the stock
of liquors of those who sell contrary to military orders ?
(b) May the military exercise a censorship over the press
and suppress newspapers at their discretion?
(c) May the military limit the right or privilege of peace-
able public assembly ?
(d) May the military prescribe to employers what classes
of laborers they shall or shall not employ?
(e) May the military establish "dead lines" within which
it is forbidded to civilians to go without a military pass, and so
restrict the freedom of movement of peacable citizens?
(f) May the military confiscate arms, or forbid traffic in
arms?
(g) Will a sentry be justified in firing on a person disobey-
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ing his orders to halt, where such person is not attempting to carry
out any felonious design ?
The affirmative of these questions represents the "Bill of Mili-
tary Rights" which the supporters of martial law would write across
the face of the Bills of Civil Rights of our constitutions. 10
The extent of military authority can, however, only be ascer-
tained when we have found the source from which it springs. Show
us, we will first ask the supporters of military dictatorship, show us
the power to declare this martial law. Can you find it expressed in
any provision of the national or state constitutions? If it is not
expressed therein but is only to be implied from some of their provi-
sions, show us from which ones. The Federal Constitution makes no
mention of martial law. A careful examination of this Constitution
makes it clear that no such power was conferred or intended to be
conferred, upon any department of the Government, either directly or
by necessary implication."1
As was pointed out in the famous case of Johnson v. Duncan, 2
when General Jackson attempted to declare martial law in New Orleans
during the War of 1812, the Constitution of the United States does
not provide that in time of public danger the executive power shall
reign supreme. It does not trust into the hands of a dictator the
reins of government. The framers of the Constitution were too well
aware of the hazards of such a provision, and had they made it, the
states would have rejected a constitution with such a clause.
We are more particularly concerned with the exercise of martial
law by the states. The power to declare martial law is expressly rec-
ognized only in four states, viz.: by the constitutions of Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and South Carolina, and by three of
these it is confined to the legislature. These provisions are contained
in their Bills of Rights. By the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights 3
"No person can, in any case, be subject to law-martial, or to any pen-
alties or pains by virtue of that law, except those employed in the
DCom. v. Shortall, 206 Pa. St. 165; 65 L. R. A. 193; see the present writer,
"Martial Law," XII Columbia Law Rev. 530.
1oW. E. Burkhimer, Military Govt. and Martial Law, 2nd ed., 1904, Chaps.
24 and 25; Winthrop, Military Law, 2nd ed., pp. 1274-1278. State v. Brown, 71
W. Va. 519; 77 S. E. 243, and notes thereto in 45 L. R. A. (N. S.) 996, and Ann.
Cas. 1914 C., p. 1. Ex parte Jones, 71 W. Va. 567; 77 S. E. 1029; 45 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 1030; Ex Parte Field, 9 Fed. Cas. 1; Hatfield v. Graham, 81 S. E. 533
(W. Va.). Re Boyle, 6 Idaho 609; 45 L. R. A. 832. Re Moyer, 35 Colo. 159;
85 Pac. 190. Cont. v. Shortall, sitpra.
"See G. B. Davis, Military Law, p. 305.
123. Mart. 0. S. (La.) 530; 6 Am. Dec. 675.
IsPart I, Article 28. I am indebted to Dr. Blaine F. Moore for assistance in
examining the various state constitutions.
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army or navy, and except the militia in active service, but by authority
of the legislature." The provisions of New Hampshire and South
Carolina are the same.14 By the Rhode Island Declaration of Rights1 5
"the military shall be held in strict subordination to the civil authori-
ties. And the law-martial shall be used and exercised, in such eases
only, as occasion shall necessarily require."
It is to be observed that these provisions of the respective Bills
of Rights of these four states are intended as limitations hnd not as
grants of power. What is the proper construction of the term "law-
martial" as there employed, it is impossible to say. It is further to
be remembered that every article in the Declaration of Rights, as well
as the constitution of a state, is subject to the paramount control of
the Constitution of the United States, which annuls and destroys
every thing irreconcilable with it."' The power of the legislature of
a state to declare martial law, in the strict sense, is doubtless for-
bidden by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution,
requiring due process of law. Yfartial law in the sense of the unre-
stricted power of military officers, or others, to dispose of the persons,
liberties or property of the citizen, is in Tennessee, declared inconsist-
ent with the principles of a free government, and is not confided to
any department of the state government.1 7  The constitutions of at
least twenty states declare that laws can be suspended only by the
legislature. By express declaration in several states no civilian can be
subjected to martial law or to punishment thereby 8
The only express grant of power to the executive to declare
martial law is contained in the constitution of the Territory of Ha-
waii. This is derived from Article 31 of the Constitution of the
Republic of Hawaii, which provided that the president might, in case
of rebellion or invasion, or imminent danger thereof, when the public
safety requires it, suspend the writ of habeas corpus, or place the
whole or any part of the republic under martial law. Under this
provision, it was held that the executive alone has discretion to decide
whether the exigency is such as to require martial law, how long it is
to continue in force, and that the measures taken by the military
authorities, such as trial by a military commission, could not be in-
quired into or reviewed by the courts.19 The trial of a citizen for trea-
14N. H., Part I, Article 34; S. C., Article I, Section 27.
"GArticle I, Section 18.
'8 fones v. Crittenden (N. C.), 6 Am. Dec. 531.
17Tenn., I, 25.
lsMd., Me., Vt., W. Va., Tenn. See also Stimson, Fed. and State Const., sec.
126, 293.
191it Re Kalanianaole (1895), 10 Hawaii Rep. 29.
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son by a military court was accordingly sustained, although the civil
courts were in session. If such a discretionary power is derived from
the constitution, it seems that it is ipso facto withdrawn from legis-
lative or judicial regulation, as no department has the right to inter-
fere with powers conferred upon another which carry or imply any
discretion.
20
The governor may, by the constitutions of most states call out
the militia to execute the laws, suppress insurrection and repel in-
vasion. 21  In the absence of a direct grant of power, the governor's
authority to inaugurate or proclaim martial law finds a constitutional
sanction, according to the ingenious court of West Virginia, as implied
in or incidental to this power in the exercise of which it is claimed he
has absolute political discretion as to the means to be employed to
make it effective.
There is indeed no objection to-allowing the governor entire discre-
tion as to the occasion for calling out the troops or as to the necessity
for keeping them on duty. But the use of the military is another matter,
and military officers do not have unlimited discretion as to the means
and measures which may be employed to restore the peace. These are
defined by law as is the exercise of force in private self-defence. It
is necessary to distinguish between the use of military power in aid
of the civil authorities, and martial law in the technical sense. In
the one case, the law governs; in the other, military force. In the
one, military power is the servant of the law; in the other, it is the
master.22 Does the provision for a militia and for its use in keeping
the peace and executing the law annihilate, by mere implication and
presumption, other express provisions of the constitution?
The military is, in all states, except New York, declared forever
subordinate to the civil power.28  As it is put in the Massachusetts
Declaration of Rights, Article 17, "And, the military power shall
always be held in exact subordination to the civil power, and be gov-
erned by it." The courts have had some difficulty with the proper con-
struction of this provision. It has been supposed by some that this
means that the military can only act under the order of the civil peace
officers, and in aid of sheriffs and other magistrates.2 4 But it would
seem that this provision could not have been intended merely to restrict
2oSee State v. Dickerson, 33 Nev. 113; 113 Pac. 1051. Barcelon v. Baker,
5 Philippine Rep. 87.
21Stimson, Federal and State Constitutions, p. 347.
22See the argument of David Dudley Field in behalf of William McCardle,
in Sup. Ct. U. S. 1868; Veeder's Legal Masterpieces, p. 969.
23Stimson, Federal and State Constitutions, p. 245, sec. 292.
24Ela v. Smith, 5 Gray (Mass.) 121 (1855); State v. Coit, 8 Ohio Dec. 62
(1897).
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the military to acting under the orders of some civil peace officer,
such as a mayor or sheriff. In a Colorado case,215 it was held that
the governor, acting through the militia, might seize and detain sus-
pects without turning them over to the civil courts, until the insurrec-
tion was suppressed. It was said that this did not violate the consti-
tutional provision that the militia shall always be in strict subordina-
tion to the civil power, since the governor acts in his civil capacity
when commander-in-chief of the state militia. Thus the clause was
allowed to have no restraining effect. But as Justice Steele points
out in his able dissenting opinion, does this provision have no mean-
ing except that the military shall always be under the command of
the governor? That is simply annulling this section of the Bill of
Rights. The provision must have some meaning. It can have no
meaning if constructed as it is by the majority of the Colorado court
in the Moyer case. Such a method of construction cannot but be
regarded as disingenuous. It is a form of juggling which makes of
our constitutions "mere scraps of paper."
The "military authorities" of a state can only be the governor
and his military representatives in command of its armed forces. The
"civil authorities" include not only the sheriff, police and ordinary
peace officers but also the courts of law to which they are subordinate.
By civil power or authority in general must be understood the ordi-
nary law, as declared by the courts of law. This provision is a declara-
tion of the supremacy of law as against arbitrary, executive discre-
tion.211 Martial law, which destroys the constitutional guaranties and
supersedes the law and the courts, renders the "military independent
of and superior to the civil power," the attempt to do which by the
king of Great Britain was deemed by our fathers such an offense that
they assigned it to the world as one of the causes which impelled them
to declare their independence.27 The whole history of English con-
stitutional development shows a dramatic and a successful struggle for
the complete subordination of executive power to law. Yet, in the
Colorado, West Virginia and Idaho cases this clause as to the sub-
ordination of the military power, has had no restraining effect, and
has either been misinterpreted, discarded, or ignored. The military
has een made largely independent of the courts and the courts have
been content to abdicate the supremacy of law and civil authority.
2-In1 re Moyer, 35 Colo. 159; 85 Pac. 190; 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 979.26"Soldiers and citizens alike stand under the law. Both must obey its com-
mands and be responsible to its courts." Fluke v. Canton, 31 Okla. 718; 123 Pac.
1049 (1912) ; Franks v. Smith, 142 Ky. 323; 134 S. W. 484; Ann. Cas. 1912 D
319; Christian County v. Merrgan, 191 Ill. 484; 61 N. E. 479.
27EX parte Milligan, 4 Wall. (U. S.) 2.
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The argument for the implied power of the governor to proclaim
martial law, create a military commission, try and sentence civilians,
and award such punishment as he may deem fit and proper was further
rested by the West Virginia court on still another ground: That this
power is a power of self-preservation, which is a necessary incident or
attribute of sovereignty and belongs in England to the crown. The
necessity for exercising this power, which must be lodged somewhere, is
determinable by the governor of the state and his decision is not
reviewable in any manner by the courts. In order to test this pre-
rogative theory it is necessary to consider the situation under the
English constitution and the common law system from which it pur-
ports to be derived.
Considerable controversy exists between English writers on con-
stitutional and military law, as to whether any power to proclaim
martial law really exists as a prerogative of the Crown, or whether the
use of military force does not depend on the common law privilege and
duty of all, ruler and citizen alike, to use any force necessary to over-
come violence and suppress disorder. In the Case of Ship Money 28
"the opinion of a majority of the judges was in favor of allowing the
crown a power to proclaim martial law, wheuever the country was in
danger; and, of the existence of that danger they held that the crown
was the sole judge . ... It was clear, however, from the Petition of
Right (1627, 3 Car. 1) that the actual decision in the Case of Ship
Money was wrong. It is the views of the lawyers who framed
the Petition of Right, and argued the case of Ship Money for Hamp-
den, which have prevailed.29
Finlason, an English lawyer who has written several works on
this subject, supports the military view that the crown once had a
prerogative to govern ordinary citizens by martial law in case of rebel-
lion which amounted to a war, and that this prerogative still remains.Y0
This power can, of course, be exercised, even according to these writers,
only if a state of war as defined by law really exists. Their contention
only goes to this extent, that the Petition -of Right is simply aimed
at martial law in time of peace, and that rebellion, when the courts are
closed, is a state of public war within the realm. Thus a proclama-
tion of martial law in England would be a declaration of a state of
283 State Trial, 826 (1637).
29Holdsworth, Martial Law Historically Considered, 18 Law Quarterly Re-
view, 124, 131; G. G. Phillimore, Journal Soc. Comp. Leg. (1900), Vol. 2 N. S.,
p. 51.
3OFinlason, Treatise on Martial Law; Commentaries on Martial Law; Re-
view of Authorities as to Repression of Riots and Rebellion. See also Forsyth,
Cases and Opinions on Constitutional Law, pp. 198, 199, 553, 556, 557.
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war. This theory seems to have been adopted by a case which arose
during the Boer war in South Africa, that when a state of rebellion
amounting to war exists, the courts have no authority or jurisdiction
to call in question the measures of the military authority."' This
case, however, rejected the ancient test of Coke, Rolle'and Hale82 that
when the courts are open it is time of peace, and treated the deter-
mination or proclamation of the military as conclusive as to when a
state of war will be deemed to exist. The denial of the jurisdiction of
the courts by this case has, however, been severely criticised.183
The better opinion would seem to be that the power to proclaim
martial law is not a part of the English constitution or common law.8 4
Professor Dicey contends that martial law does not apply in England
even to rebels. He cites Wolf Tone's case as illustrating the noble
energy with which the judges have maintained the rule of regular law,
even at periods of revolutionary violence. Every proclamation of mar-
tial law, either in the United Kingdom or the colonies, has been fol-
lowed by an Act of Indemnity. These acts are always so framed as
to protect only such measures and proceedings as have been done bona
fide and of necessity to meet the emergency.35 This is evidently on
the ground that the existence of any such prerogative is either denied
or doubted, and that it is necessary to protect persons who have acted
bona fide in time of war or insurrection by a special retroactive statute.
It would seem evident that to uphold, the declaration of martial
law as a war measure, as certain English writers do,excludes the power
from the states. It is, accordingly, necessary for the West Virginia
court to go to the extreme of claiming an alleged war power in the
various states; and the court holds that the governor of a state may,
like the king of England, declare martial law during a time of insur-
rection by virtue of the sovereign war power of the state. The West
Virginia court thus puts its theory: "The declaration of a state of
war was, in law and in fact, a recognition or establishment of a state
of belligerency, and made the inhabitants of the military district tech-
2"1E parte Marais (1902), A. C. 109.
821 Hale, P. C. 344; Hist. Common Law, p. 42, 43; Rushworth Historical
Collections, Vol. II, Appendix, pp. 79, 81.
33Edinburgh Review, Jan., 1902, Vol. 195, p. 79; see also Dicey, Law of Con-
stitution, 7th ed., pp. 283, 288, 545; Sir. F. Pollock, 18 Lau. Quar. Rev. 152; The
Case of Marais, 18 L. Q. R. 143, 148; XII Columbia Law Rev. at p. 536.
34Wolfe Tone's case (1798) 27 State Trials 614. See Phillimore, Journ.
Soc. Comp. Legis, Vol. 2, N. S., p. 51; Grant v. Gould (1792). 2 Hen. Black-
stone 69, 98. Certainly it has never been recognized or established clearly. See
Blackburn, J., R. v. Eyre (1868), Finlason's Report at p. 74; R. v. Nelson & Brand
(1867), Frederick Cockburn's Report, 59.
35195 Edinburgh Review,"p. 90.
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nically enemies of the state.'"36 But the learned court fails to observe
the distinction between the kind of military authority which may be
exercised by the federal government over enemy territory in war and
that exercised by a state in putting down riot within its own borders.
Insurrection and war are not convertible terms, and calling mob vio-
lence and persistent rioting by the name "rebellion" does not reduce
the legal status of citizens to that of public enemies.3 7
In the case of military occupation of enemy territory the presi-
dent and his officers have an absolutely free hand. As it is clearly
explained by Air. Cushing, in an opinion which he gave when attorney-
general,39 "This is incidental to the state of solemn war, and apper-
tains to the law of nations. The commander of an invading, occupy-
ing or conquering army rules the invaded country with supreme pow-
er, limited only by an international law and the orders of the sover-
eign or government he serves or represents. . . . This does not
enlighten us as to martial law in one's own country, and as admin-
istered by its own military commanders. This is a ease which the law
of nations does not reach."
Accordingly, the oft-quoted doctrine that martial law may pre-
vail when the courts are closed and not able to administer justice, as
this is a state of war, does not apply to the states even if it be sound as
to the United States. It cannot therefore be claimed that the gover-
nor has power to establish a military commission as incident to his
power to declare a state of war. The language of Taney, C. J. in
Luther v. Borden, that the supreme court could not question the
authority of the state legislature to declare martial law during Dorr's
Rebellion, as it was a state of war in which the state might resort to
the rights and usages of war, is very unfortunate and misleading.
41
That was an action of trespass q. c. f. brought against Borden and
others in the Federal Circuit Court for breaking and entering the
house of Luther. The justification set up by the defendants was that
the plaintiff was aiding and abetting an insurrection, and had been
under arms in the carrying out of his traitorous designs. The defend-
ants justified not under any civil precept or warrant, but under mili-
tary orders to arrest the plaintiff, and if necessary to break and enter
his dwelling house and search the rooms where he was supposed to be
concealed. It was claimed that such orders were authorized by an Act
36State v. Brown, supra.
37See Alleghany Co. v. Gibson, 90 Pa. St. 397, 417; the Prize Cases, 2 Black
(U. S.) 635, 673.
39VIII, Opinions of Atty. General, at p. 369.
"7 How. (U. S.) 1, 12 L. ed. 58; this is properly criticized and the true
doctrine stated in 2 Willoughby on the Constitution, p. 1238.
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of the General Assembly of the state of Rhode Island, June 24, 1842,
declaring martial law. One of the main questions of the case was
whether this statute purporting to establish martial law over the
whole state could be deemed constitutional.
Taney, C. J., holds that while it was not necessary to inquire to
what extent nor under what circumstances the power to declare
martial law may be exercised by a state, that a military officer might
lawfully arrest without a warraiit anyone whom he had reasonable
grounds to believe was engaged in the insurrection. He might order
a house to be forcibly entered and searched for the purpose, using
only sufficient force to accomplish the object, and being answerable
for unnecessary or wilful violence. The Chief Justice said that the
state must determine what degree of force the crisis demands, and that
he saw no ground at that time upon which the Supreme Court could
question the authority of the legislature to declare martial law. The
Royal Charter of 1663 was the only constitution which Rhode Island
had until 1842.
Mr. Justice Woodberry dissented as to the constitutionality of
this statute in one of the most searching and able discussions of mar-
tial law to be found anywhere in the books. He clearly demonstrated
among other things that the Act of the Legislature of Rhode Island
could not be upheld as a war measure.41
As was pointed out by Justice Woodbury, domestic violence is
to be regarded, not as a state of war giving belligerent rights, but
as conferring only the powers of peace on the state. These are
to be exercised through its civil authorities, aided by its militia,
until the general Government interferes and recognizes the contest as
a war. The Constitution expressly provides that "The Congress shall
have power to declare war 42 (Art. I, See. 8). To remove all doubt
on the exclusiveness of the war power in Congress in all cases, domes-
tic or foreign, there is a prohibition on the states43 that "No state
shall, without the consent of Congress, engage in war unless actually
invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay." This
manifestly refers to danger from a foreign enemy threatening invasion,
which is always used as contrasted with domestic insurrection.4 4  A
41Despan v. Olney, 7 Fed. Cas. No. 3822, p. 534, another Dorr case, though
decided in 1852, which cites Luther v. Borden as holding that the legislature of
a state may declare martial law, is open to the same observations, as also to the
criticism that in neither of these cases was there any necessity of going much
further than to uphold a legislative extension of ordinary common law
rights of arrest without warrant.
4 2Art. I, Sec. 8.
43Art. I, Sec. 10.
44Luther v. Borden, 7 How. (U. S.) pp. 71-73.
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state of the Union, therefore, has no constitutional power to go to war,
either with itself or with other states, or to give to its citizens the
status of public enemies with no rights which the military are bound
to respect. The maxim, Inter arma silent leges, does not apply in a
state, and authorities as to military government which may be exer-
cised by an invading general over the inhabitants of enemy territory
during a public war (such as that exercised in the South in the War
of the Rebellion) do not apply. Martial law exercised by a state or
by the United States on the request of the state, in putting down
domestic riot and disorder among its own citizens must be supported
if at all on some basis entirely different from military government,
which can only be exercised in time of war and by the United States.45
It has been supposed by some that the power to declare martial
law is connected with the power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus.
By the constitutions of most states this writ can only be suspended,
when, in cases of invasion or rebellion, the public safety requires it.
By the constitutions of several states the writ can never be suspended
in any case. The constitutions of several states provide that the writ
can only be suspended by the legislature, and in other states this is
implied by the due process of law clause.46 "It has been the settled
law of this country ever since 1807 that the suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus is a legislative and not an executive function . ..
If, therefore, the power to suspend that writ must stand or fall with
the power to establish absolute martial law, the inference is inevitable
that no such regime can be established by the executive."'T
It has been suggested that the practical object of suspending the
writ of habeas corpus is to permit and authorize the arbitrary arrest
and imprisonment of persons against whom .no legal crime can be
proved. As was said by Judge Deady, in the ease of McCall v. Mc-
Dowell et al:48 "Plainly expressed, the suspension of the privilege of
the writ is an express permission and direction from Congress to the
executive to arrest and imprison all persons for the time being whom
he has reason to believe or suspect of intention or conduct in relation
to the rebellion or invasion which may be injurious to the common
weal. If the suspension of the privilege of the writ is not
intended to authorize and permit arrests without ordinary cause or
warrant, for what is it intended ?"
45See Col. H. C. Carbaugh, Marti:itaLaw, 7 II. Law Review, 479, 495; Winter
v. Dickerman, 42 Ala. 92 (1868), a case relating to military occupation during
the Civil War.
48Stimson, Fed. and State Const., p. 127.
47EX parte McDonald, 143 Pac. 947, 951 (Mont. 1914).
481 Abb. (U. S.) 212; 15 Fed. Cas., p. 1235, Case No. 8673.
UNCONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS
This idea is, however, repudiated by Air. Justice Davis, in the
great case of Ex parte Milligan.49 "The suspension of the writ does
not authorize the arrest of any one, but simply denies to the arrested
the privilege of the writ in order to obtain his liberty." It merely
enables the government to detain a prisoner arrested for good cause
for an indefinite time, without trial or bail. It does not legalize seiz-
ures otherwise arbitrary. No charter for undefined and unlimited
authority even in the legislature can be found here. All other reme-
dies for illegal arrest remain and may be pursued against the parties
making or continuing them. The suspension of habeas corpus is there-
fore wholly unlike and falls far short of martial law. 0
It has been held, however, by the Supreme Court -of Colorado,
in the Moyer case,5 1 that, entirely independent of the authority of
the governor to declare martial law, or to suspend the writ of habeas
corpus, any person may be arrested by the military authorities on sus-
picion of participating in, or aiding and abetting an insurrection, and
the legality of the arrest and detention cannot be inquired into or
reviewed by the courts. It is argued that if offenders or suspeels must
be handed over to the civil courts they might be released on bail, and
left free to rejoin the rioters. Further, the military might be sub-
jected to actions of replevin by those whom they had deprived of their
arms, and might be required to return them to those who would thus
be equipped to continue their lawless conduct. It is further held that
the courts cannot review the facts upon which the governor acted, in
arresting suspects, as this would be a direct interference with his
authority. The court argues that, since the military may resort to the
extreme measure of taking life in order to suppress insurrection, the
milder means of seizing and imprisoning the persons participating in
riot must a fortiori be justifiable.
Does the Colorado court then mean to contend that the military
may execute and put to death any person merely on suspicion? As
Justice Steele points out in his able dissenting opinion, the power to
resist or arrest rioters engaged in the open disturbance of the peace is
a very different matter from a power to arrest any one whom the gov-
ernor or the military accuse or suspect of possible future participation
in such disturbances. It is a matter for amazement that courts should
acquiesce in the claim that any, citizen may be arrested at the mere
404 Wall. 2, 115.
GOLuther v. Borden 7 How. 1, 60; Griffin v. Wilcox, 21 Ind. 370; Pomeroy,
Constitutional Law, Sec. 708-714; 2 Willoughby on the Constitution, Ch. 62, p.
1247; Cooley, Principles of Constitutional Law, p. 289; G. B. Davis, Military
Law, p. 332.
rI-l re Moyer, 35 Colo. 159; 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 979; 117 Am. St. Rep. 189.
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pleasure of these military policemen, and confined in a prison cell
incommunicado for many months, at their discretion without remedy.
52
If they are to hold prisoners until order is restored, what assurance or
limit is there on the length of time a man may be held I Yet the Colo-
rado court decides that persons so arrested by the military on suspicion
only may be restrained of their liberty, without warrant or charge,
until such time as the governor declares the insurrection to be at an
end and order to be restored.
The Supreme Court of the United States has unfortunately lent
apparent countenance to this pernicious doctrine. Chas. W. Moyer
sued former Governor Peabody of Colorado for false imprisonment
without due process of law at the hands of the militia acting under the
Governor's orders. He was not arrested as a rioter taken in the act,
but merely on suspicion, and was detained, it was alleged, for over two
months without probable cause and without any attempt to bring him
before the courts or prefer a charge of crime. The Federal Court sus-
tained a demurrer to the complaint, and the Supreme Court affirmed the
decision on the ground that the allegations did not show that he had
been deprived of his liberty without due process of law.53
Justice Holmes says in his opinion: "So long as such arrests
are made in good faith or the honest belief that they are needed to
head insurrection off, the governor is the final judge; and he cannot
be subjected to an action after he is out of office on the ground that
he had no reasonable ground for his belief." The Supreme Court
thus holds that as far as the 14th amendment is concerned, a wanton
abuse of power must be alleged, and that the discretion of the com-
mander is limited only by good faith. He cannot be compelled to
show reasonable and probable ground for believing in the necessity
of the detention. This doctrine is at least consistent with the nominal
supremacy of the law and civil courts, although the language used
does not seem as carefully weighed as one would expect from the
learned Justice or the Court.5 4 It is of course not necessary that the
state should go to the full extent of its constitutional power in dele-
gating military authority.
As Blackstone says, "The glory of the English law consists in
clearly defining the times, the causes, and the extent, when, wherefore
and to what degree, the imprisonment of the subject may be lawful.
This it is which induces the absolute necessity of expressing upon
52See Skeen v. Monkheimer, 21 Ind. 1; Jones v. Seward, 40 Barb. (N. Y.)
1563 (1863) ; Ex parte Moore, 64 N. C. 802, 807.
53Moyer v. Peabody, 148 Fed. 870; affirmed 212 U. S. 78; 53 L. Ed. 410.
5411 Willoughby, Const. Law, p. 1241.
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every commitment the reason for which it is made, that the court
upon a habeas corpus may examine into its validity, and according to
the circumstances of the case, may discharge, admit to bail or remand
the prisoner." (Bbl. Com. III, p. *129, 133; I p. *135). If the
grounds of the imprisonment of persons arrested without warrant
cannot be inquired into by the courts, and if the governor is the sole
judge of the necessity to imprison and detain suspects, then the writ
of habeas corpus is certainly evaded, if not suspended, for all prac-
tical purposes." 'When an insurrection is prolonged, as in Colo-
rado, such a doctrine may result in the indefinite detention of mili-
tary prisoners. This is a form of punishment and the summary trial
and punishment of offenders by military commission might be prefer-
able to such detention. The Montana court, while it professes to
follow this Colorado doctrine shows a disposition to limit it, and to
inquire, from time to time, into the necessity of the detention.
47  It
would seem that military prisoners should be turned over to the civil
authorities for trial, as soon as that could be safely done, to-wit, when
danger of rescue is over; and that the courts should at least inquire
into the facts as to the good faith and the necessity of military deten-
tion and why prisoners have not been delivered to the civil authorities.
If not martial law, then what? it may be asked. One who sup-
poses that the ordinary law is helpless in the face of violence, disorder,
and public danger shows himself very ignorant of the authority and
resources which the law affords. Before we throw constitutional
liberty overboard, even for a day, let it be clearly proved that the re-
sources of the common and statutory law are inadequate. It will be
found that the government has within the constitution all the powers
which are necessary to preserve its existence and that of society. The
strong arm of the Federal Government is behind the state governments
by express constitutional mandate to insure them a republican form of
government, and to protect them from domestic violence too strong to
be overcome by local authority. This is not a war power, but a peace
power.
The orthodox common law doctrine as to the source and scope of
the powers of the military may be termed that of public self defense
5rSee It re Boyle, 6 Idaho 609; 45 L. R. A. 832, note. Cf. Johnson v. Jones,
44 Ill. 156; 92 Am. Dec. 159. The suspension of the privilege of the writ does
not go far. That enables persons to be arrested on suspicion and detained with-
out bail or speedy trial by paralyzing one remedy. This Colorado doctrine kills
the right itself, by authorizing arbitrary imprisonment and by substituting execu-
tive order and the vague plea of "military necessity" for grounds and causes
defined by law.
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or police powerY' According to this doctrine the military is merely
an extension of the police force of the state for the restoration of
public order. Thus the intervention of the military does not introduce
martial law.
As was said by Tindall, C. J., in charging a grand jury on the
occasion of the Bristol riots,5 '7 "The law of England hath, in proportion
to the danger which it attaches to riotous and disorderly meetings, made
ample provision for preventing such offenses, and for the prompt and
effectual suppression of them whenever they arise."
Lord Mansfield, the great expounder of the common law, in anim-
pressive speech on the employment of the military to quell the Gordon
riots of 1780, denied before Parliament that this proceeded from any
extraordinary exertion of the royal prerogative, or that it could only be
justified by proclamation of martial law. "Every individual, he said,
"in his private capacity, may lawfully interfere to suppress a riot,
much more to prevent acts of felony, treason, and rebellion. * * *
What any individual may lawfully do for the prevention of crime and
the preservation of the public peace may be done by any number
assembled to perform their duties as good citizens. It is the peculiar
business of all constables to apprehend rioters, to endeavor to dis-
perse all unlawful assemblies, and, in case of resistance, to attack, to
wound, nay, kill, those who continue to resist ;-taking care not to
commit unnecessary violence or to abuse the power legally vested in
them. * - * The persons who assisted in the suppression of these
tumults are to be considered as mere private individuals acting as duty
required. My lords, we have not been living under martial law, but
under that law which it has long been my sacred function to administer.
* * Supposing a soldier, or any other military person who acted
in the course of the late riots, had exceeded the powers with which he
was invested, I have not a single doubt that he may be punished, not by
court-martial but upon an indictment."
"Consequently the idea is false that we axe living under a military
government, or that, since the commencement of the riots, any part of
the laws or of the constitution has been suspended or dispensed with.
* * * The military have been called in, not as soldiers, but as citi-
56Franks v. Smith, 142 Ky. 232; 134 S. W. 484; Ann. Cas. 1912 D, p. 319; Fluke
v. Canton, 31 Okla. 718; 123 Pac. Rep. 1054. See also authorities collected in
dissenting opinions by Robinson, J., State v. Brow, 77 S. E. 255, 256; EX parte
Jones, 77 S. E., Rep. 1053. See also Stephen, History of the Criminal Law, Vol.
1, p. 214; W. H. Moore, Act of State in English Law, p. 48; Dicey, Law of the
Const., 7th ed., 538; 2 Hare, Am. Const. Law, p. 906; W. M. Ivins, 18 Albany Law
Journal, 85; II Willoughby, Const. Law, 1241; XII Columbia Law Review, 529,
573 State Trials, N. S. 1; 5 C. & P. 254, 261.
738
UNCONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS
zeus. They were employed (no matter whether their coats were red or
brown) not to subvert, but to preserve, the laws and constitution which
we all prize so highly." "5
At common law the powers of peace officers are in general re-
stricted to the following things:
(1) To making arrests with, and in some cases without warrant,
and overcoming resistance thereto.
(2) To resisting felonious outrages and all breaches of the
peace and repressing violence.
(3) To dispersing riots, routs, and unlawful assemblies, and
clearing the streets.
The powers of the military, coming to the aid of civil authorities,
would seem in general to be limited to what peace officers may do,
unless valid statutes give them additional powers. At common law
a peace officer could not arrest any one merely because suspected of
being an agitator or instigator of disturbances, or of being guilty of riot
or any other misdemeanor. American common law, however, seems dis-
posed to grant this authority to the military, and to go to the extent of
holding that the exercise of the police powers justifies not only the arrest
but also the temporary, provisional, preventive detention of dangerous
characters during an insurrection. The courts of some states will
refuse to release such prisoners on habeas corpus. If this power is to
be recognized, it is the courts who are to control it, and inquire from
time to time into the facts. We pride ourselves in America on being
governed by law; yet there is scarcely a country in Europe in which
more independent discretionary power is claimed by virtue of executive
authority than here.
There is, however, a sharp distinction between the power of a
policeman to arrest and the power of a policeman to constitute himself
a court or legislature and try and convict, sentence and execute of-
fenders for violations of law or of his own orders. The governor or
militia have no more power to do this than any ordinary police officer,
and against the assumption and assertion of such power we should
record an emphatic protest. The power of the executive to arrest and
detain rioters taken in the act, and also those suspected of criminally
inciting to riot and violence, until they may be turned over to the
civil courts, is merely an extension of the executive powers of ordinary
peace officers; but the power to try and punish is a judicial, not an
executive, power.
As a matter of common law, therefore, the powers of the military
583 Campbell, Lives of the Chief Justices, p. 415; 21 Par]. Hist. 688-698.
HENRY WINTHROP BALLANTINE
would seem to be preventive, defensive, and ministerial, with no
authority to issue orders to citizens generally, or to punish those who
disobey commands or commit offenses. Under the ordinary law which
at all times prevails, property may be destroyed to prevent the spread-
ing of fire or of pestilence and public danger will justify the impress-
ing of private property into public service in eases of actual or appar-
ent necessity. The maxim Satus PopuZi Suprema lex, that the good
of the individual must yield to the public safety, gives liberal scope
to the common law justification of necessity. The common law doctrine,
while it admits that extraordinary occasions may require extraordinary
measures, yet insists that measures for public safety be limited by the
reasonable necessities of the case, even in time of war."
It has been suggested by, Sir Frederick Pollock that so-called
martial law is "the justification by the common law of acts done by
necessity for the defense of the commonwealth when there is war in the
realm." He suggests that trespasses should be justifiable, when they
are "acts which any prudent and courageous magistrate would certain-
ly do under the circumstances," and that "the existence of reasonable
and probable cause for the act complained of, having regard to the
public danger, is necessary and sufficient to justify it." Juries, he
says, are not likely to take an unduly narrow view of what a man may
reasonably do in the public interest on such an occasion. But any
abuse of power on the pretext of public need for ends of private
malice should be severely dealt with. The ordinary courts have at all
times jurisdiction to review and regulate military measures and good
faith alone is not a sufficient justification. 9
It may be that we should expand somewhat by statute the com-
mon law justification of necessity and public self defense and of the
authority of peace officers in these cases. If our laws are defective
in regulating the use and possession of fire arms, or of the occasions on
which saloons should be closed, or on which those who threaten to vio-
late the peace and incite others to violence may be subjected to pre-
ventive detention, they should be amended, and statutes should be
enacted to cover possible emergencies. The laws should not be sup-
plemented by the arbitrary orders of executive officers.
The M%,lontana Supreme Court in its recent decision 0 repudiated
the claim that the civil courts are without jurisdiction to order the
6lCase of the King's Prerogative in Saltpetre, 12 Rep. 12; Mouse's Case, 12
Rep. 63; Com. v. Marsh, 2 Duv. (Ky.) 193; Mitchell v. Hariony, 13 How.
(U. S.) 115; 14 L. Ed. 75; W. H. Moore, Act of State in English Law, p. 48;
12 Col. Law Rev. 529.
59F. Pollock, What Is Martial Law? 18 Law Quar. Rev. 152.
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release of a prisoner held by the militia after declaration of martial
law. The Court further held that neither the governor nor the
military under him can lawfully punish for insurrection or for other
violations of the law. The courts can not be ousted by the agencies
detailed to aid them, nor can their functions be transferred to tribunals
unknown to the constitution. The argument that the weakness of civil
courts and officers and the state of public feeling would render trials
by jury ineffective, that the guilty would not be prosecuted or pun-
ished, and that military trials are therefore necessary, is treated
with scant respect. Ample relief is afforded by statutory provisions
for a change of venue. It is not the function of one department to
supply the defects of others or to usurp their functions. This is not
even an argument from necessity, but from convenience only. "Ne-
cessity" is the excuse invariably given for lynching and for mob law
itself.61 If the civil magistrates and officers are intimidated, or in sym-
pathy with the rioters, they may be removed, as was actually done by
the civil courts in Butte. To open the courts is part of the duty
devolving upon the military, and no closure by them can be recognized.
The attempt to try and punish offenders in Butte during the month of
September by military courts was, therefore, abortive, a solemn and
pompous farce. All their decisions are wiped out, and the penalties
and punishments inflicted must be remitted as far as possible.
It is unfortunate that the military arm of the government must
be used in these labor disputes, but when it is so used great pre-
cautions should be observed to avoid all appearances of arbitrary,
illegal and oppressive action. It is to be hoped that the authorities
will keep in view not only the importance of restoring peace, but also
the importance of restoring peace with justice, and without depriving
the humblest citizen of his confidence in the law and the lawful govern-
ment. It is necessary to look to the future as well as to the apparent
necessities and needs of the moment, and to the possible after-effects
of stamping out disorder by the iron heel of martial law.
The laborers and workers of this country may come to believe
that in the matter of the use of the military they are being discrimi-
nated against and that military power is being arbitrarily used as a
tool in the interest of capital but is never exercised to protect the
interests of the workers. It behooves those who must wield this dan-
6OEx parte McDonald, supra.
61By W. Va. Constitution, "any departure therefrom .under the plea of
necessity or any other plea, is subversive of good government, and tends to
itnarchy despotism."
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gerous but necessary force to inform themselves of the limits on their
authority and avoid the overbearing, bullying, antagonizing attitude
that accompanies delusions about martial law, and to remember that
their function is to restore the peace, and to preserve and enforce the
law, not to supersede it, and that in general they are limited by what
under the laws peace officers may do.
62
From a practical as well as a theoretical point of view, necessity
never requires that the constitution be suspended and set aside or
that the citizens be subjected to arbitrary military orders. Such claims
are not only unfounded in law but also unwarranted on grounds of
expediency. Experience proves that officious intermeddling of the
military, however benevolent the motive, is not an unalloyed blessing.
Lawful authority is adequate to meet any situation that may arise.
State statutes often purport to prescribe the occasions on which
martial law or a "state of insurrection and rebellion" (whatever the
consequences of that are) may be declared by the governor. In some
states there are statutes asserting that members of the militia shall
not be liable, civilly or criminally, for acts done while in active service,
and that they shall not be prosecuted therefor in any court; also that
military officers may exercise their discretion and be the sole judge
as to what means are necessary to restore peace. These statutes are
for the most part crude and ill-considered attempts at legislation,
apparently drawn up by those who have a peculiar eagerness to turn
over absolute authority to an irresponsible military dictatorship, with-
out any attempt to make a proper adjustment of the use of force to
the safeguards of constitutional liberty. These statutes are no doubt
largely unconstitutional, as a deprivation of the fundamental rights
of the citizens under both the state and federal constitutions.
It might be supposed that the legal principles governing the use
of the military in this country would be thoroughly established. In
fact hardly any subject is so buried in darkness and misapprehension.
The law is in a dangerous and disgraceful condition, misleading to
the military, and fraught with peril to the community and to the
citizen. In view of the importance of these questions, testing as they
do the liberty of the individual citizen on the one hand and the su-
preme powers of government and social self-preservation on the other,
and in view of the sudden and dramatic crisis in which they arise, de-
manding instant decision, it is not a little strange that they have thus
far received so little thoughtful attention. Some military code or
62The United States Commission on Industrial Relations is now making an
elaborate investigation of this whole subject in all its phases.
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system should be worked out under which the citizen will be pro-
tected in his rights, the community in its peace and safety, and the
soldier in knowing the extent of his authority. It will require much
study and labor on the part of some one to formulate such a code,
which may be adopted by the various states, by which the duties and
powers of the national guard may be properly defined, and by which
measures for public safety may be reconciled with constitutional
liberty.
